Go to content
Man beside a laughing toddler in a swing outside.
Model photo: Yadid Levy / norden.org

1. Setting the scene: Low income and childhood in the Nordic welfare states

Tone Fløtten

1.1 Introduction

International comparisons show that most children and young people in the Nordic region enjoy good living conditions. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden are all among the twelve highest ranked countries on the UN Human Development Index (UNDP, 2025). In its 2024 analysis, the OECD also points out that the Nordic population generally enjoys a high level of prosperity and good living conditions (OECD, 2024). In terms of specific indicators of economic vulnerability in 2024, Denmark, Finland and Norway had a lower proportion of children in households with income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (i.e. relative poverty) than almost all other European countries, while Sweden was close to the European average (Eurostat, table ilc_peps01n). The proportion of children experiencing severe material or social deprivation – defined as lacking at least seven of thirteen necessities of life for economic reasons – is also significantly lower in the Nordic countries than in Europe as a whole (Eurostat, table ilc_mdsd11).
However, developments over time show that not all children are sharing in the general growth in prosperity. The proportion of children living in low-income families has risen over the past two decades, which has contributed to growing political and societal attention. Governments, research communities, and voluntary organisations have placed child poverty high on the agenda, both because of its extent and because persistent low income can have serious consequences for children’s everyday lives, opportunities, and future prospects.
These developments are also relevant beyond the Nordic region. The Nordic countries are often seen as an important best case for child well-being, given their high levels of prosperity and extensive welfare provision. That child poverty, measured as low income, can nevertheless increase and persist makes the region a useful case for understanding how economic hardship can emerge despite strong social protection, and what it takes to prevent it. The Nordic case further demonstrates that child poverty encompasses more than unmet basic needs; it also involves constraints on participation and social inclusion. In affluent societies, limited resources can restrict children’s opportunities to take part in activities that are widely seen as normal, with potential consequences for well-being, learning, and a sense of belonging. Recent trends also suggest that global economic pressures, such as rising living costs, housing market dynamics, and labour market changes, can translate into increased vulnerability even in countries with extensive welfare provision. The Nordic experience therefore speaks to a broader international question: how resilient are welfare systems to shocks and structural change, and which policy mixes best protect families with children over time?
This first chapter provides a brief contemporary analysis of child poverty in the Nordic countries, based on existing research and policy literature. Rather than providing a systematic literature review, the aim is to synthesise key insights from relevant studies and policy documents in order to contextualise current discussions on children growing up in households with low incomes. In this context, child poverty is discussed as a multidimensional societal issue with implications for children’s living conditions, family well-being, and broader welfare state dynamics. Consequently, the chapter draws on research linking child poverty to children’s rights frameworks, distributive justice perspectives and analyses of the long-term social and economic sustainability of the Nordic model. Three themes are addressed. First, what were the driving forces behind the emergence of the Nordic focus on poverty in the 1990s? Second, how has the Nordic debate on child poverty been shaped over time by different problem framings and key thematic strands? And third, why the extent and development of children living in low-income families continues to be monitored, even though the Nordic countries are internationally distinguished by good living conditions?
In this chapter, we use the term child poverty as a descriptive label for children living in families with a low income. None of the Nordic countries has an official definition of poverty, nor an official poverty measure or a nationally defined poverty line. In statistics and research, poverty is primarily understood as a relative phenomenon, and levels and trends are therefore typically described using international measurement practice, most notably the EU’s ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator (Fløtten, 2022). This is a relative measure based on household income. According to this indicator, individuals with an equivalised disposable income below 60 per cent of the national median (EU60), are classified as being at risk of poverty. In Nordic research, this situation is often discussed using the terms ‘child poverty’ or ‘children growing up in poor families’. In official contexts both the term ‘poverty’ and the term ‘low income’ are used to describe low-income conditions. In this chapter, we use the term ‘child poverty’ to refer to the broader public and policy debate, while ‘low income’ denotes the income-based indicator commonly used in Nordic statistics.

1.2 A Nordic debate on child poverty

Today, child poverty is a recurring theme in public debate in all the Nordic countries. The term is frequently used in policy documents, media coverage, and research literature, and the issue is highlighted as a key challenge in the Nordic welfare states. This has not always been the case. Three decades ago, child poverty was rarely discussed as a distinct policy issue. Few policy initiatives took children’s economic vulnerability as their point of departure, and the concept had a limited place in public discourse.
One important explanation for this historical lack of attention is the strong and broadly shared prosperity that characterised the Nordic countries throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The period combined high economic growth with low unemployment and a major expansion of the welfare state, in which equality in living conditions was a central political objective. While the origins of Nordic welfare arrangements lie in pre-war reforms and post-war institution-building, the decades from the 1960s to the 1980s were marked by consolidation and scaling-up. It was during this period that the Nordic approach became more firmly established as a recognisable model, combining universal social rights, a broad public service sector, and labour-market institutions designed to sustain high employment and limit inequality (Dølvik et al., 2015).
A key pillar was the primacy of work. Policies aimed to secure near-full employment through macroeconomic steering and active labour-market measures, while public services, most notably childcare and education, supported parents’ labour-force participation and, over time, the development of the dual-earner family model. At the same time, coordinated wage bargaining and relatively strong unions contributed to wage compression and reduced earnings dispersion. Redistribution was further strengthened through progressive taxation and a benefit structure that relied heavily on universal schemes, also in areas central to families with children, supplemented by means-tested support when needed (Dølvik et al., 2015).
Crucially, the Nordic welfare state not only redistributed income, but it also redistributed costs and risks through comprehensive public provision. Subsidised early childhood education and care, free or low-cost schooling, accessible health services, and a broad range of social services reduced households’ out-of-pocket expenses and helped equalise children’s everyday living conditions across social groups. These arrangements were intended to promote both material security and equal opportunities, and they were underpinned by high levels of trust and relatively broad political support for social investment and redistribution.
In societies marked by rising prosperity, consistently low unemployment, and comparatively low economic inequality, poverty was therefore not seen as a pressing social problem. It was widely assumed that most families with children had sufficient resources, and that remaining economic differences would be contained, or corrected, through the established mix of high employment, compressed wage structures, universal transfers, and comprehensive public services. Within this frame, poverty tended to be associated with marginalised groups or exceptional circumstances rather than as a risk affecting children (Fløtten et al., 2009; Galloway et al., 2010; Karlsson & Svedberg, 2022; Fløtten, 2023).
The societal changes that gained momentum in the 1990s – rising income inequality, changing family forms, increased immigration, and greater international attention to relative poverty – helped to understand that children could also be e economically marginalised within the framework of the Nordic welfare states. As research and statistics provided a clearer and more extensive knowledge of the extent and trends of low income among families with children, child poverty moved onto the political agenda and became an well-established area of research.

Key drivers of the debate

As argued by Fløtten et al. (2009), there were four main drivers behind the growing attention to poverty: civil society mobilisation, research and knowledge production, European-level impulses, and party-political dynamics. While first developed for Norway, this framework is relevant for understanding why child poverty has gained prominence across the Nordic countries. We begin with civil society mobilisation, which has been central in problematising child poverty and sustaining public attention over time.
Civil society organisations have played a particularly important role in raising awareness of the issue in the public debate. In the 1990s and early 2000s, organisations such as Save the Children, Mødrehjelpen, the Salvation Army, UNICEF, and the Church City Mission began to document children’s living conditions, produce reports and field-based accounts, and challenge the authorities. Save the Children Sweden, for example, has been an active driving force in bringing child poverty onto the public agenda in Sweden. Since the early 2000s, the organisation has regularly conducted studies of children’s living conditions in Sweden, most recently in 2025 (Salonen & Rosenlundh, 2025). Through campaigns, alternative budgets, consultation responses, and systematic media engagement, civil society organisations have framed child poverty as a social policy problem that requires sustained political attention.
A clear research interest has also emerged related to children’s living conditions, economic vulnerability, and the consequences of growing income inequality. More systematic analyses of child poverty were established in the 2000s, based on register data and studies of living conditions. This research has problematised definitions and measurement methods and has highlighted the extent and consequences of poverty for children and young people (see, for instance, Korpi & Palme, 1998; Forssén, 1998; Fløtten, 1999; Bonke, 2003; Ottosen & Skov, 2013; Kuivalainen & Nelson, 2012; Eydal & Ólafsson, 2012). In turn, this body of research has provided civil society organisations and politicians with a knowledge base that has helped to elevate the discussion about the phenomenon.
The increased political attention must also be seen in light of European influences. At the EU summit in Lisbon in 2000, social inclusion and the fight against poverty were defined as an explicit political goal within the Union’s open method of coordination (Fløtten et al., 2009). This placed pressure on EU member states and EEA countries to report on social policy efforts and results, and helped to make the problem of relative poverty, including child poverty, more prominent on national agendas. Additional attention was also paid to child poverty in connection with the European Year of Poverty in 2010 (Karlsson et al., 2015).
Additionally, party political driving forces have been central. On the one hand, social democratic and left-wing parties in the Nordic region have used child poverty as an argument to strengthen universal benefits, reduce economic disparities, and ensure better living conditions for families with children. On the other hand, centre-right parties have also helped to place the issue on the agenda, but occasionally through a different framework for understanding the problem. These discussions have often been linked to the incentive effects within the work-oriented approach, the design of integration policy, or the balance between universalism and targeted measures aimed at vulnerable groups.
In Denmark, for example, the introduction of what are known as the poverty benefits (kontanthjælpsloft [cap on social assistance], the 225-hour rule (a person on cash social assistance could have their benefit reduced if they could not document at least 225 hours of regular, unsubsidized work within the past 12 months), and integration benefit) triggered clear political divides. Governments led by left-wing parties and their supporting parties have justified the reforms on the grounds that ‘it must pay to work’ and presented the kontanthjælpsloft as a reasonable work incentive. On the left, the Green Left (SF) and the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten), in particular, supported by analyses from the Economic Council of the Labour Movement, have referred to these reforms as poverty benefits that would almost double the number of poor children and drive thousands of children into poverty – and therefore proposed abolishing them as part of an offensive against child poverty (Danish Ministry of Employment, 2015; Danish Parliament, 2016; Juul et al., 2016). Both the benefit cap (kontanthjælpsloftet) and the 225-hour rule were, however, abolished as of 1 July 2025 (Folketinget, 2024).
Despite party political differences, poverty reduction has long been recognised as an important policy objective across much of the Nordic political spectrum. In Finland, for example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health published an action plan during Sanna Marin’s five-party coalition government to reduce poverty and social exclusion by 2030 (Social- och hälsovårdsministeriet, 2022). In Norway, child poverty has likewise been highlighted as a distinct policy area across governments. Centrist parties such as the Christian Democratic Party (KrF) and the Liberal Party (Venstre) have been among the actors promoting child poverty as a policy concern of its own. Norway’s first action plan against poverty was presented by a centre-right government (Sosialdepartementet, 2002). The issue has since been followed up through strategies and new action plans both by left-wing and right-wing governments (Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet, 2007; Departementene, 2023). There is also broad agreement that employment-oriented policies are central to lifting families out of poverty. Political disagreements have mainly concerned the strength and design of the policy instruments used to realise the goals of the work-oriented approach (i.e., the work-first principle: prioritising paid employment as the primary route to welfare and social inclusion, and using benefits, services, and obligations to encourage labour-market participation) (Dølvik et al., 2015).
Collectively, these actors – civil society, research communities, the EU level, and political parties – have created considerable momentum around child poverty as a social policy issue and have contributed to making it a key challenge in the Nordic welfare states.

Central issues in the child poverty debate

Although the public debates on child poverty in the Nordic countries have developed within different national contexts, similar themes and problem framings appear to recur over time. The sections below outline a set of recurring themes in Nordic discussions. This overview is not based on a systematic or exhaustive analysis of public discourse in each country. Rather, it highlights themes that have been prominent in policy and public debate. The emphasis on these themes may vary across countries, and while additional themes may also be relevant, they are not covered here. Our focus is on six themes that recur across these debates: 
  1. How should child poverty be understood and measured?
  2. Which groups are particularly at risk of experiencing relative income poverty, and why?
  3. Why is relative income poverty increasing (or not decreasing)?
  4. How is income poverty linked to disadvantage among children?
  5. What measures are effective in reducing and ‘alleviating’ the consequences of low income?
  6. The impact of the cost-of-living crisis on children in low-income families.

How should child poverty be understood and measured?

Against the backdrop of reports indicating that the Nordic countries face a child poverty problem, and that the problem has increased significantly at certain points, a frequent theme in the child poverty debate has been how poverty should be defined and measured. In line with common practice in other Western countries, the Nordic countries have relied on a relative definition of poverty. In other words, poverty has not been understood as the absence of the bare necessities of life, as implied by an absolute definition (Rowntree, 1901). Rather, poverty is seen in relative terms as a situation in which people lack the resources to maintain an ordinary material standard of living or to participate in social life on an equal footing with others (Townsend, 1979).
While there is broad agreement that poverty should be understood as a relative phenomenon, there is ongoing debate about how it should be measured in practice. Should assessments be based on income, living conditions, or a combination of the two? And where should the threshold between the poor and the non-poor be drawn? Across the Nordic countries, measurement has largely followed the European indicators for relative income poverty, notably the at-risk-of-poverty threshold set at 60% of equivalised median income. In addition, measures of persistent low income are often used as an important reference point.
The relative poverty measure is problematised partly because it does not always adequately describe children’s actual living conditions and opportunities for social participation. Research has shown that there is relatively limited overlap between an income-based poverty measure and measures of the material or social standard of living (Fløtten & Pedersen, 2009; Mood & Jonsson, 2016). The discussion of measurement problems and the limitations of relative poverty measures has, in turn, led to different national initiatives to develop alternative measures of children’s economic vulnerability also in the Nordic countries:
  • Save the Children Sweden developed its own measures for ‘economic vulnerability’ that combined low income standards and income support (social assistance) (Salonen, 2002). The first reports attracted a great deal of attention, precisely because many people did not associate Sweden with child poverty, and the estimate of almost 300,000 children living in poverty was met with both surprise and scepticism. Over time, the measure has been at the centre of the Swedish child poverty debate; but it has also been criticised, particularly in a Dagens Nyheter column in 2021 in which Carina Mood and Jan O. Jonsson claimed that Save the Children Sweden ‘inflates’ poverty figures and erodes the concept of poverty by defining all children in households with income support as poor (Mood & Jonsson, 2021). In a response article, Tapio Salonen and Anna Angelin emphasised that the measure was deliberately stringent and rooted in children’s rights, and that in practice, income support often did not ensure a reasonable standard of living for families with children receiving long-term benefits (Salonen & Angelin, 2021). In its 2025 report, Save the Children Sweden launched a revised poverty measure, arguing that the old measure had underestimated economic vulnerability (Salonen & Rosenlundh, 2025).
  • In Denmark, the Thorning-Schmidt government appointed an independent expert committee in 2012 to examine methods for measuring poverty and propose an official Danish poverty threshold. The 2013 report by the Ekspertudvalg om fattigdom [Expert committee on poverty] recommended a relative poverty threshold (50% of median income combined with duration and wealth criteria), which formed the basis for an official Danish definition of poverty (Ekspertudvalg om fattigdom, 2013). However, this threshold was disputed by the centre-right for exaggerating poverty (Bostrup, 2023), while researchers and organisations believed that the measurement was, on the contrary, too narrow (Erjnæs & Larsen, 2013). A change of government in 2015 led to the new government abolishing the official poverty threshold.
  • In Norway, there have also been discussions about how effective the relative poverty measure is in affluent countries. In 2006, researchers argued that Norway needed a revised definition of poverty, because the established measures gave unclear signals about both the level and the trend in poverty (Pedersen et al., 2006). In 2008, the philosopher Lars Fr. H. Svendsen published an article criticising the relative poverty measure for encompassing ‘too many people’ and thus producing unreasonably high poverty figures (Svendsen, 2008). In 2009, the opposition parties in the Storting, the Norwegian parliament, asked the government to present a ‘supplementary measure of poverty, an absolute measure based on Norwegian conditions’ (NTB,2009). In 2013, a new round followed when the Minister of Labour, Anniken Huitfeldt, problematised the EU’s relative poverty measure and argued for a poverty definition ‘that everyone could agree on’ (Ruud, 2013). It was not until a decade later, in 2022, that the authorities commissioned a study of poverty measures that could supplement the ‘persistent low income’ indicator. The report from Statistics Norway was published in 2024 (Langørgen et al., 2024), and the Government’s Status Document on the continuation of equal opportunities in childhood states that the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs (BFD), together with the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth, and Family Affairs (Bufdir) and other ministries, is to further consider the recommendations on supplementary indicators (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 2024).
Taken together, these examples show that the choice of poverty measure has been highly contested and, in part, politicised across the Nordic region. Also internationally, not least in the Innocenti reports by UNICEF on child poverty in affluent countries, the Nordic countries are highlighted both as relatively equality-oriented societies where the choice of indicators has a significant impact on how much poverty is ‘seen’ – particularly when comparing income measures, material deprivation, and subjective measures of deprivation (UNICEF Innocenti, 2023). Therefore, the debate on measurement has both a technical and a political side: what is defined and measured as poverty determines how extensive the problem appears to be and which groups are particularly vulnerable, and thus which political solutions are relevant.

Groups at particularly high risk of low-income

Another theme in the Nordic poverty debates considers who is affected. Low-income is unevenly distributed, and both research and reports from civil society show a fairly similar risk profile throughout the Nordic region. Children living in households with a single parent, a weak or unstable connection to the labour market, an immigrant or refugee background, and often with many children face a significantly higher risk of low-income than others.
The discussions typically emphasise that many of the children in the high-risk groups also face challenges in other areas. This leads to an accumulation of problems in certain groups, which makes developing useful and effective measures particularly challenging. A more detailed description of the distribution of low-income in the Nordic countries is presented in chapter 2.

Explanations for trends in low-income figures

The third main theme concerns why poverty is increasing or not declining. Nordic research and policy often emphasise how demographic change, labour-market developments, and welfare-policy reforms interact to shape low-income trends. Macroeconomic conditions, such as recessions or periods of high inflation, can further have a bearing on poverty by affecting employment and household purchasing power.
Poverty trends, in turn, are closely linked to explanations of why some groups are at greater risk of low income than others. Some demographic groups, for example, have unstable employment and low earned incomes, which has an impact on low-income trends, if the share of these groups in the population increases. Similarly, if there are more people in groups with a high risk of being dependent on public benefits, this will also show in the low-income figures.
The interplay between demographics and the development of income security schemes is evident in recent Norwegian research. Statistics Norway has shown that around half of the increase in the proportion of children in poor families between 2010 and 2022 in Norway can be explained by changes in the composition of the population (increase in children from Eastern Europe, Africa, and West Asia). The rest of the increase reflects the fact that there are more poor people within each group. The report does not link the growth in child poverty to low labour market participation (there has been increased labour market participation in many groups during the period); but those households that are dependent on income transfers, including some immigrant groups, have been left behind because the transfers, on average, have developed less strongly than other incomes (Eika & Langørgen, 2025).
In a comparative analysis of explanations for the growth in numbers of children in low-income families within the Nordic region, Statistics Norway points to both demographic and economic changes. In around 2005, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden had about the same proportion of children in low-income families (between 8 and 10%). By 2020, the share had increased to around 20% in Sweden and around 14% in Norway, while it was around 10% in Finland and Denmark (Epland & Hattrem, 2023, Fig. 3.3).
One explanation for this is the weaker income growth among families with children at the bottom of the income distribution in Norway and Sweden compared with Denmark and Finland. This, in turn, is related to the fact that the number of working parents at the bottom of the income distribution increased in Denmark and Finland and decreased in Norway and Sweden. As a result, earned income accounted for a declining share of household income at the bottom of the wage distribution in Norway and Sweden, while the opposite happened in Denmark and Finland. Another explanation is the demographic development. There was a clear increase in immigration in Norway and Sweden, and children with immigrant backgrounds accounted for an increasing proportion of the lower income groups in these two countries. Similar developments have not taken place in Denmark and Finland.
In terms of the importance of income transfers, the recent rise in child poverty in Denmark has been linked to how social assistance and child-related benefits are designed. The Economic Council of the Labour Movement (Caspersen, 2024) points out that the number of children below the poverty threshold rose again in 2023 after having fallen since 2017, and that this trend must be considered alongside the fact that the temporary child allowance for recipients of social assistance ended in 2023. However, in an analysis from December 2025, Caspersen and Kongstad (2025) note that the number of children growing up in families with an income below the poverty threshold declined in 2024, meaning that the situation in 2024 was the same as in 2022. According to Caspersen and Kongstad, this decline should be viewed alongside decrease in the number of children with one or more parents receiving cash assistance. This includes a fall in the number of Ukrainian children with parents receiving cash assistance from 2023 to 2024, as well as a continued decline among other children with parents receiving cash assistance between 2023–2024 and mid-2025.
In Norway, the under-indexation of the universal child benefit has gradually weakened its income poverty-reducing effect. Between 1996 and 2019, the benefit was not adjusted in line with prices, resulting in a steady erosion of its real value. Researchers at Statistics Norway have argued that weak growth in cash transfers, child benefit included, has contributed to rising poverty rates, particularly among single-parent households (Eika & Langørgen, 2025).
Bucelli and McKnight (2023) show that child poverty risk in Finland is low on average, but considerably higher among children in single-parent households, large families (three or more children), and immigrant families. They associate these disparities with a more precarious labour market, characterised by temporary contracts, low work intensity, and pressure towards part-time work. In a labour market like this, single parents and immigrants are more likely to end up in low-paid or unstable employment. Larger families’ higher consumption needs are also highlighted as a factor that increases vulnerability to external shocks, including sharp price increases.
Analyses by Save the Children Sweden (Salonen & Rosenlundh, 2025) show that children in single-parent households and children with a foreign background face a markedly higher risk of poverty. The report highlights that up to half of children living with a single, foreign-born mother are economically vulnerable. These patterns are linked to lower employment rates and weaker income conditions among foreign-born parents compared with Swedish-born parents, and to the fact that gaps between native-born and foreign-born adults are larger in Sweden than in many comparable countries (Salonen & Rosenlundh, 2025).
These examples illustrate that several explanations for low-income trends recur across Nordic research. Changes in poverty rates are best understood as the outcome of interactions between demographic developments, labour-market change, and welfare policy. Shifts in population composition and labour-market structures shape which groups face the highest risks, while the level, design, and regulation of income-security schemes influence the extent to which these risks translate into incomes falling below the poverty threshold. Overall, research suggests that low-income trends cannot be attributed to a single driver; rather, they reflect the combined effects of multiple, interrelated structural changes.

Child poverty and disadvantage – increased risk, varied outcomes

Research from the Nordic countries on the consequences of income poverty conveys a twofold message. On the one hand, studies consistently show that children growing up in low-income families face a higher risk of disadvantage in a range of living-condition domains compared with their peers. Some differences emerge early in childhood, while others become more visible in adolescence or later in adulthood. On the other hand, an increased risk does not imply that all children in low-income families experience such disadvantages; in many studies, the disadvantages affect only a minority.
This is illustrated by the Danish study Børn og unge i Danmark [Children and young people in Denmark] (Ottosen et al., 2022), which examines children’s material well-being. The study finds that 7% of children and young people aged 3–19 live in families with low material affluence, whereas 34% live in families with incomes below the 50% poverty threshold (Ottosen et al., 2022, Figure 1.3.1). The comparison suggests that low income is associated with a substantially higher risk of low material affluence. At the same time, it also implies that 66% of children in income-poor families do not fall into the category of low material affluence. Similar patterns are reported in other studies linking poverty to different aspects of living conditions. Keeping this duality in mind is important when discussing the consequences of poverty: low-income increases the probability of disadvantage, but it does not determine outcomes for all children.
The relationship between family income and living conditions is extensively documented and summarised in recent Nordic reviews, including Ekonomisk utsatthet i alla åldrar [Economic vulnerability at all ages] (Håkansson, 2024), En barndom for livet [A childhood for life] (Ekspertgruppen om barn i fattige familier, 2024) and Muligheter og hindringer for barn i lavinntektsfamilier [Opportunities and obstacles for children in low-income families] (Hyggen et al., 2018). Since these works provide broad and systematic overviews, the literature is not reviewed in detail here.
Overall, research indicates that low family income in childhood is associated with a wide range of outcomes. These include lower participation in early childhood education, weaker school performance, a higher risk of dropping out of upper secondary education, and more constrained educational choices. Low childhood income is also linked to a higher risk of exposure to violence, poorer housing conditions and more frequent residential moves, poorer physical and mental health, and higher mortality. In addition, it is associated with lower participation in organised leisure activities and stronger experiences of social exclusion and a higher likelihood of offending and contact with the criminal justice system in adolescence and young adulthood (Galloway & Skardhamar, 2010; Ejlskov et al., 2022; Brå, 2023). Finally, low income during childhood is associated with weaker attachment to the labour market and lower earnings in adulthood, as well as a higher risk of persistent low income later in life.
There is little disagreement that children in low-income families face a higher risk of disadvantages in living conditions. The debate increasingly concerns whether these associations are causal – low income itself contributing to poorer outcomes – or whether they primarily reflect correlated characteristics of the family and the wider upbringing environment. Much of the available evidence is based on study designs that can identify robust associations, but they do not allow unambiguous conclusions about causal mechanisms. This is particularly relevant for outcomes such as criminal behaviour, where family income co-varies with a range of other factors that shape risk, including parental education, employment and health, family instability, neighbourhood conditions, and prior adversities. Studies that apply more demanding designs to account for unobserved family-level characteristics, such as sibling comparisons, often find that associations are substantially attenuated or no longer statistically clear once shared family factors are controlled for (Sariaslan et al., 2021). As a result, it is often difficult to determine whether observed disadvantages are attributable to low income per se or to underlying and co-varying factors.
This distinction matters directly for policy (Mayer, 1998). If inadequate economic resources constitute the primary mechanism, income-enhancing measures are likely to be most effective. If other factors are more decisive, effective responses will need to be broader, targeting the family situation and the child’s upbringing environment in addition to, or instead of, household income.

Which measures are effective?

A fourth key theme is which measures actually work against poverty. Discussions about political measures are closely linked to what are considered to be the main causes of poverty and what negative consequences we wish to counteract.

Preventing poverty

Firstly, measures are discussed that can prevent families from falling into income poverty, or that can help them get out of it. There is widespread agreement that work is the most important safeguard against poverty, and so labour market policy is the government’s key instrument in all the Nordic countries. This is evident in government programmes, public reports, action plans, and budget work. For instance, the current Swedish and Danish government programmes emphasise the importance of a work-oriented approach (Government of Denmark, 2022; Government of Sweden, 2022b), as do the Norwegian authorities in their national budget (Ministry of Finance, 2023). Icelandic authorities similarly highlight labour market participation as a key measure against poverty, stating in an official presentation of labour market equality policy that active participation in the labour market is “considered one of the most important ways to prevent social isolation and poverty’.
At the same time, it is recognised that the breadwinners in some of the families at high risk of low-income struggle to enter the labour market due to problems with health, skills, or language, for example. The road to increased income through work is long for many. This leads to debates about trade-offs between benefit levels and work incentives. Transfers to those outside the labour market must be sufficiently generous to enable families to maintain a reasonable standard of living, but it must always pay to work. Balancing these two considerations involves difficult trade-offs.
There are many examples of this dilemma taking centre stage in all the Nordic countries. In Denmark, the discussion on the poverty threshold and cap on social assistance [kontanthjælpsloft] has clearly shown the tension between the desire for a work-oriented approach and the need to ensure that children in households on long-term benefits do not fall too far behind the standard of other children (Andersen et al., 2019). Similar issues can be found in the report of Ekspertgruppen om barn i fattige familier [the Norwegian expert committee on children in poor families] (2023), in a Swedish public report on social insurance and the welfare system (Berg & Kruse, 2022), and in the interim report of the Finnish Social Security Committee (Government of Finland, 2023).
A further issue in debates on effective anti-poverty policy is the balance between cash transfers and services for families with children. Research and expert input highlight that increasing universal child and family benefits can be among the most effective instruments for reducing child poverty, particularly when benefits are not means-tested and therefore also reach families with weak or unstable attachment to paid work (Ekspertgruppen om barn i fattige familier, 2023; Skalická & Eikemo, 2025). Because cash benefits directly raise disposable income, they can move households above relative poverty thresholds in the short term and provide families with flexibility to prioritise spending according to their needs.
At the same time, many argue that service-based measures, such as free core hours in early childhood education, reduced fees in after-school programmes, and support for children’s leisure activities, are crucial for promoting participation and counteracting social exclusion even when income remains low (Bråten et al., 2014; OECD, 2024). Such measures may also alleviate economic strain by reducing necessary expenditures and can be understood as a form of in-kind support. Even so, service provision is often framed as a complementary strategy with effects that materialise over a longer horizon. By improving children’s access to developmental arenas, strengthening parental employment opportunities, and reducing barriers to participation, it may help prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty and disadvantage. In this sense, services can mitigate the consequences of low income and promote equal opportunities, but they may be less likely than cash transfers to reduce measured income poverty in the short term.

Preventing the intergenerational transmission of poverty

Secondly, policy discussions also focus on measures to prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty. A central approach in this regard is social investment policy which emphasises early and sustained investments in children’s capabilities and families’ opportunities. One distinctive feature of the Nordic model is the scale of public investment in children and families through universal services and equalising institutions (Dølvik et al., 2015; Mogstad et al., 2025). Across the Nordic countries, children have access to healthcare with very low or no user charges, early childhood education and care is heavily subsidised, and education is publicly funded from primary school through higher education. Beyond general subsidies, participation in early childhood education is also supported through measures such as free core hours and targeted outreach efforts aimed at groups with traditionally lower enrolment. In addition, all countries have initiatives designed to help children with different needs succeed in the education system, for example through early identification, special needs support, and programmes to strengthen learning outcomes and completion rates.
Social investments through childhood and education policy form a foundation for enabling broad participation in the labour market. Even so, young people enter working life with different skills, qualifications, and resources. In the youth policy area, the social investment logic is therefore extended to measures aimed at preventing early detachment from education and employment. A prominent example is Finland’s Youth Guarantee (introduced in 2013), which aims to ensure that all young people are offered employment, education, activation measures, or rehabilitation within a short period after becoming unemployed to prevent prolonged exclusion and the accumulation of problems. More broadly, the Nordic countries have a long tradition of lifelong learning policies, skills reforms, and active labour-market measures, often highlighted in Nordic and international analyses as core building blocks of the Nordic version of social investment policy (de la Porte & Larsen, 2023).
Social investment policy generally enjoys broad support, yet it is also subject to debate. One line of critique is that social investment initiatives may have a Matthew effect, disproportionately benefiting those who are already relatively well-positioned to take advantage of education, training, and activation measures (Colombarolli & De Luigi, 2025). Another concern is that an increased emphasis on early childhood education, education more broadly, and activation may come at the expense of more traditional redistributive and protective schemes, such as unemployment benefits, social assistance, and disability benefits. Morel et al. (2012) argue that social investment can become a ‘modernisation project’ that prioritises human capital formation and a work-oriented approach, while compensatory protection is weakened, particularly for groups that are ‘expensive’ or difficult to invest in. Finally, sustaining high levels of social investment may become more challenging in the context of an ageing population and the resulting pressure on public budgets (de la Porte & Larsen, 2023).

Alleviating the effects of poverty

Thirdly, policy debates also address measures aimed at alleviating the potential consequences of poverty. Many children will live in families with persistently low incomes for all or part of their childhood. Policy discussions emphasise measures that seek to safeguard children’s current living conditions and participation in society, even when household income remains low. A recurring concern is how to support children in low-income families to ensure that economic constraints do not hinder their everyday participation, well-being, or educational progression. While the social investment measures discussed above are primarily intended to support learning, completion, and later labour-market participation – and will not be discussed further here – this strand of policy focuses more directly on children’s current quality of life.
In this context, participation in organised leisure activities is often highlighted as particularly important. Access to sports, cultural activities, and other social arenas can strengthen children’s well-being, provide supportive peer networks and adult contacts, and reduce experiences of stigma and exclusion. Measures such as activity cards, subsidies for membership fees and equipment, free or low-cost holiday activities, and cooperation with voluntary organisations and municipalities are therefore frequently presented as key instruments for improving living conditions in the short term for children in low-income families. Participation is supported through a mix of general public subsidies to organisations that provide activities, targeted public support schemes, and contributions from the private sector and voluntary organisations. Research suggests that such support can increase the extent to which children and young people participate in activities together with their peers (Fløtten & Hansen, 2018; Arnesen & Hansen, 2024; Högman et al., 2024; Ministry of Education and Culture, 2024; Marttinen & Anttila, 2025).
Although there is broad agreement that children should be able to participate in leisure activities, and that participation is recognised as a right under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, there have also been warnings against placing too much weight on such measures in poverty policy. One concern is that targeted schemes aimed specifically at low-income families, such as Sweden’s fritidskort [leisure card], may have stigmatising effects. Another concern is that narrowly targeted poverty measures can entail high administrative costs (Amnér, 2025). Moreover, several contributions point out that these initiatives are primarily compensatory: they mitigate some of the consequences of poverty, but do not reduce income poverty as such (Bekken et al., 2018; Rogaland revisjon, 2024). While free or subsidised leisure activities can produce quick and visible results, there is also a risk that a focus on discrete measures diverts attention from the need for more far-reaching, structural change. Related concerns are raised in the international social investment literature, which warns that investments in services and human capital may, in some contexts, displace attention from income protection for the most vulnerable (Cantillon & Van Lancker, 2013; Noël, 2018).

The impact of the cost-of-living crisis on children in low-income families

In recent years, the cost-of-living crisis and the surge in inflation have become more prominent in Nordic debates on child poverty. Although low-income rates have levelled off or even declined slightly in some countries (see Chapter 2), recent studies suggest that many low-income families nonetheless experience an unchanged or worsening financial situation in practice. Sharp increases in the prices of food, electricity, and housing have eroded purchasing power, particularly among households already facing tight financial constraints.
Save the Children Sweden’s most recent child poverty report argues that the cost-of-living crisis, especially rising food and housing costs, has been a key driver of increasingly difficult living conditions for children in economically disadvantaged families, and that standard poverty indicators do not fully capture this development. The report introduces a revised measurement approach and estimates that around 276,000 children live in economic vulnerability in Sweden. This is roughly 100,000 more than cited in previous estimates, highlighting the recent cost-of-living pressures as an important part of the explanation (Salonen & Rosenlundh, 2025). This knowledge has been actively mobilised in public debates about the Government’s benefit reforms and proposed benefit ceilings [bidragstak]. As a response, civil society actors warn that stricter eligibility requirements and caps may further increase child poverty (Widerberg, 2025; Stenquist, 2025).
In Denmark, analyses by the Economic Council of the Labour Movement show that the number of children living below the poverty threshold rose in most municipalities in 2023, before declining again in 2024 (Caspersen, 2024; Caspersen & Kongstad, 2025). The increase in 2023 was not primarily attributed to the cost-of-living crisis, but rather to policy-driven factors, especially changes to the benefit system, including the withdrawal of child-related benefits and the under-indexation of transfers relative to wage increases. Under Denmark’s Act on a Rate Regulation Percentage (Lov om en satsreguleringsprocent), a range of social benefits are annually uprated using a rate derived from wage growth in the ‘wage year’, defined as the year two years prior to the fiscal year. In periods of high inflation and rapid wage growth, this mechanism can contribute to a lag in benefit adjustment, amplifying the erosion of purchasing power among families with children who rely on public transfers (Caspersen, 2025).
For Finland, Eurochild (2025) shows that the proportion of children experiencing material deprivation has risen sharply in recent years, from 3.7% in 2021 to around 10% in 2024. Eurochild links this development to changes in the benefit system, not to inflation or increased living costs. On the other hand, Smith et al. (2024) show that the situation for families with children worsened in 2022 due to inflation and increased energy and living costs. The authors refer to an estimate by Kela (the Finnish social security institution) and the ITLA Children’s Foundation that around 30,000 children would fall below the poverty threshold in 2022 because of increased costs. An ITLA report also indicates that low-income families, particularly large families, have been especially hard hit by rapidly rising prices linked to the war in Ukraine, including necessities such as food and energy (Bucelli & McKnight, 2023).
In Norway, the number of people receiving social assistance is rising sharply (Lima, 2025), with much of the increase linked to Ukrainian refugees’ need for temporary income support during settlement and labour-market entry. In parallel, studies document that many families have become significantly worse off financially in recent years, and that those who were already struggling are facing even greater hardship (Poppe & Kempson, 2023; Gyüre & Lynum, 2024).
In all the Nordic countries, there are also reports of an increased need for food aid:
  • According to SIFO, half of all single parents in Norway struggle to afford enough healthy food for their children, and many report that they have to skip meals or forgo necessary food items (Skuland et al., 2025). Fafo has pointed to an increase in the need for food assistance and that half of those who collect food parcels from food distribution centres in Norway have children under the age of 18 living at home (Fløtten et al., 2023).
  • Sveriges Stadsmissionen’s poverty reports show that families with children are a core group among people in need of food assistance, and that food distribution has become increasingly central to their work, over time (Stadsmissionen, 2019; Stadsmissionen, 2025).
  • The Danish Food Bank reports distributing increasing amounts of surplus food alongside growing needs among children and young people (Danish Food Bank, 2023).
  • A study by Rambøll (2024) among financially vulnerable families with children in Denmark concludes that many families are under severe financial pressure and that children in these families lack necessities.
  • Finland’s poverty report for 2024 (EAPN-Fin, 2024) and a news article on All Things Nordic (2025) conclude that the need for food aid has increased here, too.
Considering developments in recent years, several authors have argued that purely income-based poverty measures, such as the EU-60 indicator, do not fully capture the effects of rapid inflation. As a result, many low-income families may have experienced a substantial deterioration in their financial room for manoeuvre even in periods when measured child poverty rates have remained stable (Fløtten et al., 2023; Salonen & Rosenlundh, 2025; Lima, 2025). Save the Children Norway has similarly emphasised in public statements that some families must choose between electricity and food’ and has used the cost-of-living crisis as justification when calling for a more generous child benefit and other income support measures (Save the Children, 2022).
The cost-of-living debate has thus incorporated several of the themes already discussed in the Nordic countries. It has intensified the measurement debate (income versus actual purchasing power and material deprivation) and renewed discussions about the most appropriate policy mix. The key question is whether price-regulating measures, increased child benefit, means-tested support schemes, or strengthened services best protect children against the most immediate consequences of the rising living costs and the economic pressure facing families with children.

1.3 Continued focus on child poverty

The Nordic countries seek to promote high employment, universal welfare schemes, and relatively low income inequality. Consequently, they have a comparatively low share of children living in low-income households, but some groups of children still grow up in families with persistent low income. Child poverty continues to be a topic of political and scholarly attention, not least because it is often seen as challenging the egalitarian ideals of Nordic societies. Evidence and monitoring practices in the Nordic countries highlight how the issue is tracked and assessed over time.
Research shows that growing up with persistently limited economic resources can be associated with differences in children’s rights fulfilment, life chances, and future opportunities. Childhood income levels are also used in international research as an indicator of how welfare-state mechanisms operate in practice. Studies further identify childhood as a sensitive period in the life course and document that disadvantages emerging early may accumulate over time (Heckman, 2006; Duncan et al., 2010). On this basis, policy-oriented research examines how measures targeting families with persistently low income are associated with both children’s immediate living conditions and their long-term development.

Violation of children’s rights

Child poverty is frequently discussed in relation to children’s rights as set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989). Children have the right to adequate food, clothing, and a safe place to live (Article 27). These are conditions intended to ensure that children can develop in the best possible way. They also have the right to rest, play, and participate in cultural and creative activities (Article 31). When families lack resources, children are at risk of being left without these basic needs and participation opportunities; and when children are not allowed to participate in social activities or lack the necessary material resources, this can inhibit both well-being and development.
The research reviewed above shows that children in low-income families are more likely than their peers to experience unstable housing and poorer living conditions and are less likely to participate in organised leisure activities. While the Nordic welfare states generally protect families from absolute poverty, recent reports indicate that increasing numbers of families with children struggle to meet basic needs, including access to sufficient and nutritious food. Children growing up in low-income households are also more likely to report lower quality of life, loneliness, feelings of shame, social withdrawal, and mental health problems.
Parents are primarily responsible for meeting their children’s needs and protecting them from poor living conditions. However, the Convention on the Rights of the Child also stipulates that public authorities have a duty to support families that lack sufficient resources (Article 27). Child poverty, both absolute and relative, can therefore be understood as an expression of shortcomings in societal arrangements, rather than as the responsibility of individual parents. This can be interpreted as indicating gaps between formal rights and observed living conditions (Sandbæk, 2017; Fløtten, 2019; Näsman & Fernquist, 2022; Holappa & Leviner, 2024).

Breaking with Nordic ideals of equality

The Nordic social model is historically rooted in egalitarian ideals of equality, solidarity, and mutual responsibility, often framed as a commitment to universal social rights, broad-based risk sharing, and the view that welfare is a collective good rather than a private matter. In his famous Folkhem speech of 1928, Per Albin Hansson described ‘the good home’ as a society characterised by equality, care, and cooperation; a community in which no one should be left behind (Hansson, 1928). The same normative orientation can be found in Erik Allardt’s classic book Att ha, att älska, att vara [To have, to love, to be] (1975). Allardt emphasises that any assessment of welfare must be grounded in an idea of what constitutes a good society and must consider what should be valued, protected, and fairly distributed. He also stresses that welfare should not be assessed solely in terms of income, but should include belonging, participation, and the ability to live a dignified life. In a Nordic context, this understanding has long been closely linked to ideals of small economic disparities and equal opportunities, supported by high employment, coordinated labour-market institutions, and extensive public services that seek to reduce class-based differences in life chances. In this tradition, a good society is one where inequalities are not too great and where everyone has genuine opportunities to participate in working and social life (Dølvik et al., 2015). At the same time, income disparities have increased in parts of the Nordic region in recent decades, most clearly in Sweden, and also in Finland and Denmark, even though the Nordic countries remain comparatively egalitarian in international perspective (Aaberge et al., 2018; SCB, 2025; Paukkeri et al., 2023).
The ideals of equality are strong. A review of recent government programmes and accession speeches from the Nordic countries shows that combating inequality and social vulnerability is a core message:

‘The government will (…) ensure that economic disparities do not become too large’ Denmark’s government policy statement (Government of Denmark, 2022).
‘General welfare must be strengthened. It is the strongest redistributive force that exists’ Swedish government policy statement (Government of Sweden, 2022).
‘Action will be taken to eliminate poverty’ (Government of Iceland, 2024).
‘We will fight inequality and injustice’ (Government of Norway, 2021).
‘The first Government for the new decade will reduce inequality and improve the position of low-income earners’ (Government Communications Department, 2019).

When children grow up with poorer material living conditions, poorer health, fewer educational opportunities, and less social participation than others, this is not just a social problem that needs to be addressed. The existence of child poverty is frequently portrayed in research and public debate as being at odds with Nordic ideals of equality. Child poverty highlights vulnerabilities in the welfare model and acts as a prism for broader societal changes. Changes in family patterns, the labour market, migration, the housing sector, and social policy are all evident in children’s living conditions. In the research literature, persistent or rising child poverty is often analysed as an indicator of pressure on the core mechanisms of the Nordic model, and of the extent to which existing policies can secure adequate living conditions for all children.
Child poverty can also have an impact on trust, which is a key resource in Nordic societies. Research shows that increasing inequality and social polarisation can undermine the population’s trust when there are major differences in children’s opportunities and living conditions, for example (Putnam, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Thus, child poverty can contribute to undermining the broad foundation of trust on which the Nordic model is built. In this sense, it not only runs counter to ideals of equality, but also shakes one of its most central pillars.

Consequences for the child – consequences for society

That child poverty has negative consequences for children’s living conditions here and now has been amply documented. Children growing up in families with persistent low income are at greater risk of material deprivation, poorer housing conditions, less participation in leisure and learning activities, and higher incidence of stress and social exclusion. Research shows that economic deprivation during childhood affects children’s mental and physical health, cognitive development, and their experiences of coping and well-being in everyday life. These are not just indirect correlations; several studies document direct causal effects of increased family income on children’s health, school performance, and social functioning (Akee et al., 2010; Dahl & Lochner, 2012).
The consequences extend far into adulthood. On average, children who grow up in low-income families have weaker school performance, a lower likelihood of completing their education, a higher risk of health challenges, and a weaker foothold in the labour market in adulthood (Havnes & Mogstad, 2011; Ekspertgruppe om barn i fattige familier, 2023). This results in lower life chances across generations. As James Heckman and other life course researchers have shown, investments in children’s early living conditions are among the interventions that yield the greatest returns – both for the child and for society as a whole – because early experiences shape later learning opportunities, health, and economic independence (Heckman, 2006).
There are significant consequences for society when childhood poverty prevents children from developing their skills and realising their potential. Lower levels of education and weaker attachment to the labour market in adulthood mean a loss of future labour and productivity that the economy needs to maintain growth, innovation, and competitiveness (OECD, 2018). A higher risk of marginalisation and health problems also places increased pressure on health and welfare services and reduces the number of people contributing tax revenues to collectively financed schemes.
A number of analyses show that child poverty imposes significant socioeconomic costs on society over the course of a lifetime in the form of lower labour market participation, weaker tax revenues, and higher use of social security and health services (NOU 2009:10; Chetty et al., 2014). Several studies suggest that long-term labour market exclusion entails higher public costs than early interventions in childhood. . Economists often refer to this as a ‘double dividend’: measures to combat child poverty both improve childhood conditions and strengthen the basis for future value creation. Thus, the fight against child poverty is not only a question of children’s rights and social justice, but also of the sustainability of society and the economic viability of the welfare state.

Social investments that benefit everyone

The Nordic region has traditionally invested heavily in universal schemes for children and families: financial transfers, subsidised early childhood education, good schools, and various services aimed at improving children’s upbringing environments. OECD figures on total child-related expenditure show that the Nordic countries rank highly in an international comparison (OECD Family Database, Table PF1.6). The social investment policy is given much of the credit for the fact that there are fewer children in low-income families in the Nordic countries and that children’s living conditions are generally good (Hemerijck et al., 2023). Even during periods of crisis, the Nordic countries have largely managed to maintain investments in children and young people (de la Porte & Larsen, 2023).
As noted above, however, questions have been raised as to whether policy succeeds in improving outcomes for all children. Many point out that the social investments improve outcomes for the average child but do not sufficiently safeguard vulnerable children, particularly those with multiple risk factors in their lives (Hakovirta & Nygård, 2021; Skalická & Eikemo, 2025; Colombarolli & De Luigi, 2025). In a comparison of poverty trends in affluent countries during the period 2008–2020, UNICEF shows that the Nordic countries do not perform well. They rank low on the list of countries that have succeeded in reducing family poverty during this period (UNICEF Innocenti, 2023). Hakovirta and Nygård (2021) present a possible explanation for this, namely that social investment policy has gradually shifted from emphasising transfers to families towards a more service-oriented approach in which poverty is to be addressed through labour-market participation. As noted above, work-oriented policy is the most important element of poverty policy in all the Nordic countries. This policy is intended to yield the greatest returns in the long term, but the question is how it affects the family’s financial situation, and thus children’s living conditions, in the here and now.
The literature generally finds strong grounds for continuing social investment approaches. Heavy investments in children and young people are cost-effective. Early investments have a particularly high socioeconomic rate of return (Heckman, 2006), and numerous studies from the Nordic countries show that children who receive early support perform better at school, complete their education, and participate more strongly in the labour market (Havnes et al., 2011; Gupta & Simonsen, 2016).
However, social investment policy must be balanced against other policy measures. Even in the pioneering Nordic countries, there are signs of dual labour markets (Berglund et al., 2021) and of some households experiencing severe financial difficulties, particularly those with low levels of education, single parents and certain immigrant groups (see Chapter 2). Eichhorst et al. (2020) caution against assuming that social investments can replace traditional social protection. The key point is complementarity between investment and protection, whereby social investments are combined with robust, universal income buffers (Hemerijck, 2017).
Continuous monitoring of the situation of children in low-income families, provides a basis for assessing whether social investment measures operate as intended and reach their target groups. Such monitoring is presented in the literature as a way to promote equitable living conditions for all, and to support the legitimacy of the policy.

Foundation for evidence-based policy

Evidence-based policy means that political programmes and measures should, as far as possible, be based on the best available knowledge about what works, for whom, and under what conditions. The ideal is deeply entrenched in the Nordic countries and is reflected in a wide range of policy documents, not least in politicians’ own statements. The concept is used so frequently that it has been argued to function as a mantra in Nordic policymaking, and there is debate as to how deep the commitment to evidence-based policy runs (Holst, 2016).
We do not engage with this debate here but instead emphasise a more fundamental point: the challenges associated with child poverty call for sound, up-to-date, and broad-based knowledge to address the challenges associated with child poverty. Child poverty is a complex phenomenon that is influenced by the labour market, integration policy, education policy, family and housing policy, the welfare state’s income security and service provision, as well as tax and wage policy – in short, a wide range of policy areas that interact.
Developments are therefore closely monitored in order to assess whether measures reach their intended target groups and that all children are given opportunities to realise their potential. Without continuous and reliable measures of child poverty, it becomes challenging to assess whether policies are effective, or whether the situation is deteriorating despite good intentions. Systematic monitoring makes it possible to detect negative trends at an early stage. Child poverty can increase rapidly during economic downturns or changes in the labour market; with effective monitoring, policies can be adjusted before problems escalate and become more difficult to tackle.
A solid knowledge base also makes it possible to prioritise resources appropriately. Knowing where child poverty is most prevalent, geographically, by family type or other characteristics, allows targeted efforts where the need is greatest, with greater impact per unit of spending. Over time, high-quality register data and analyses also make it possible to evaluate whether specific measures, such as support schemes, tax reductions, or services, help to reduce child poverty. Without such knowledge, there is a risk of continuing measures that are ineffective.
Knowledge also provides a basis for preventing future societal costs. Child poverty is associated with an increased risk of poorer health, lower educational attainment, weaker labour market participation, and higher reliance on social benefits in adulthood. By monitoring developments, it becomes possible both to estimate the gains from interventions and the costs of inaction, thereby strengthening the case for early and well-targeted measures.
A strong knowledge base in this field therefore requires analyses at several levels: monitoring the extent and development of child poverty, studies of how different policy instruments operate in practice; comparative analyses between the Nordic countries and also from a broader international perspective; and research that highlights children’s and young people’s own experiences. Collectively, these are important building blocks for policies that help to reduce child poverty. Child poverty in the Nordic region is a complex societal problem affecting individual children, their families, and the sustainability of the Nordic model. It is a matter of children’s rights, a question of distributive justice, and an issue concerning the future development of society. Attention to child poverty is often framed not only as a moral and rights-based concern, but also as relevant to discussions about the sustainability of the Nordic equality model.

1.4 A joint Nordic project

Child poverty in the Nordic region is not a marginal phenomenon, but an expression of structural challenges in otherwise strong welfare states. Because child poverty violates children’s fundamental rights and runs counter to the ideals on which the Nordic model is built, the problem is frequently framed as warranting sustained political and professional attention. Investments in children are investments in future generations – and in the continuation of societies characterised by equality, trust, and social sustainability. From this perspective, there are several arguments for close Nordic cooperation to target child poverty.
Firstly, the Nordic countries share a fundamental social model. Despite national variations, the countries exhibit substantial structural similarities: a large and universal welfare state, high employment, strong and organised labour markets, relatively small economic disparities, and close tripartite cooperation. The combination of broad, taxpayer-funded welfare schemes and a regulated but flexible labour market make it possible to combine economic efficiency with social equality. The model is also distinguished by high levels of trust and a strong tradition of evidence-based and consensus-oriented policymaking (Dølvik et al., 2015). It is precisely these shared features, comprehensive welfare systems, high ambitions for equality, and a political culture grounded in knowledge, that provide a solid foundation for a joint Nordic project to counter child poverty.
Secondly, the Nordic countries share fundamental values such as equality, universalism, social mobility, and children’s right to good and secure living conditions. These values contribute to child poverty being framed as a legitimate and high-priority goal in all countries and create a normative community that strengthens the potential for joint strategies.
Thirdly, all the Nordic countries have clear political ambitions to reduce child poverty, often articulated in strategies, action plans, or sectoral policy objectives. Although the content of these plans varies, they all point in the same direction: increased efforts for children in low-income families, improved services, and closer follow-up. Nordic cooperation can provide opportunities to compare policy effects, learn from different approaches, and avoid the development of parallel but poorly coordinated policy trajectories.
Fourthly, the countries face several shared challenges. Rising economic inequality, integration challenges, a strained housing market, and an ageing population that places pressure on welfare budgets directly and indirectly affect the risk of child poverty. When the challenges are similar, it is also likely that policy instruments may be transferable across national borders.
Fifthly, the Nordic countries have a long tradition of cooperation on welfare issues through the Nordic Council of Ministers, research networks, and professional development processes. This infrastructure makes it easy to share data, compare experiences, and develop a common knowledge base. Strengthened cooperation on child poverty will not start from scratch but build on established institutions and a culture characterised by trust and collective problem solving.
The combination of shared values, structural similarities, similar challenges, and well-established arenas for cooperation provides a foundation for discussions about more coordinated Nordic approaches to combat child poverty – for the benefit of children, families, and future Nordic societies.